Encheiridion 1

Some things are under our control, others are not. Under our control are belief, determination to act, desire, aversion, and in a word, whatever is our own doing. Not under our control are our body, property, reputation, employment, and in a word, whatever is not our doing.

Forget about the underlying Greek text for a minute and just consider the credibility of these claims as we would understand them in ordinary English. Our immediate reaction is incredulity, is it not? My body is not under my control? Under whose control is it then? My property is not under my control? Who then owns it? How in the devil have you come to this list of things I can and cannot control, philosopher? What kind of research and investigations have you conduct? I know that disease can impair my control of my body. I know the government asserts eminent domain over most of realty. My control is nowhere complete or certain or infallible, but I do try to control some externals with apparently some success. What are you trying to tell me? That I over-estimate my control or its reliability? Well perhaps, but then don’t just say these things are not in my control. Forbear to treat me to your dogmas, if that is what they are, but if you know anything useful about the actual limits of our ability to control things, I am all ears.

What does Epictetus mean by “under our control? The Greek phrase is “eph’ emin”, which could as well be translated “in our power” or “up to us.” It turns out that for Epictetus nothing is eph’ emin unless nothing can prevent or hinder our bringing it about or achieving or acquiring it. Since under some circumstances our control over all externals fails, Epicteus concludes that no externals are in our control. If not in unfailing control, then not in control at all. I don’t think I need to comment on that argument by definition. But I would put one additional question to Epictetus: what makes you think desire and choice and belief are in our control on this absolute standard? You think what you believe and choose and desire are always up to you, and not, for example, sometimes at the mercy of the fragile health of our brain & nervous systems? What is your evidence that this is so?

Several other passages in the Discourses and Fragments repeat this same story without the theology that Arrian’s summary sees fit to delete. See Discourses I.1 and IV. 7, and Fragment 4. A provident God has placed some things in our power and other things beyond our power, we are told there. Does that help, or does it make it even more obvious that we are dealing with (religious) dogma, not scientifically based and sustainable argument?